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A FINE FORE HAND 
by 
Paul Ziff 
"As long as a branch of science offers an abundance of problems, so long is it 
alive: a lack of problems foreshadows extinction or the cessation of independent 
development."1 On this occasion here and on his birthday and whenever one is 
doing philosophy these words of David Hilbert seem particularly appropriate. 2 
The aesthetics of sport is supposedly the subject. It is not a serious subject if it 
has no significant problems. There are no significant problems that can sensibly 
be characterized as problems in the aesthetics of sport. 
Metatheoretic discussions of what is or is not in the province of aesthetics 
are largely exercises in futility tiresome and fruitless. But conceivably here 
and now this dismal generalization should be disregarded. Certain research 
should be encouraged, other discouraged. Research devoted to the aesthetics 
of sport can accomplish nothing. There is nothing there to be accomplished . 
Worse, it would not only contribute to the vaunted dreariness of aesthetics: it 
could serve to delay and even impede other possibly significant research. 
There are philosophically interesting and perplexing features of athletic 
behavior. There are deep philosophic questions about physical activity that are 
worth answering. When there are important paths to explore, why maunder 
about in the vacuity of an aesthetics of sport? 
In philosophizing about sport one could, but need not, begin by worrying 
about what is and what is not a' sport. One could attempt to fix limits, draw 
boundaries. I shall not. That's a dull matter best left to linguists and lexicog­
raphers. It's not as though this were a novel problem of analysis. Drawing 
boundaries and fixing conceptual limits are generally difficult in nonformal or 
nonrigorous domains and are almost invariably unproductive. Anyway, examples 
of sports are easy enough to come by. Archery is a sport, so are auto racing, 
badminton, baseball, basketball, bicycling, bobsledding, bowling, boxing . So 
are bull fighting and canoeing. Cave exploration is sometimes accounted a sport. 
So are curling, fencing, field hockey, fishing, football, gliding, golf, gymnastics 
and handball. There's no problem about examples: there are all kinds of 
examples. Judo, karate, lacrosse are all sports. So are pigeon racing and polo, 
so are sho9ting and tiddlywinks. 
If one is concerned with the aesthetics of a certain class of things then the 
members of that class must characteristically have certain aesthetic aspects. 
The aesthetics of that class would then concern itself with the aesthetic aspects 
of the members of the class. If it should prove to be the case that the members 
did not characteristically have aesthetic aspects, there would be nothing for the 
aesthetics of the class to be concerned with. The aesthetics of sport is in almost 
but not quite that position. Some sports happen to have aesthetic aspects. Most 
sports do not. And no novel and significant problem is posed by those sports 
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that do happen to have aesthetic aspects. 
Anything has an aesthetic aspect, so one might think, but is that true? I 
think not. "The record number of clay birds shot in an hour is 1,308 by 
Joseph Nother (formerly Wheater) (born 1918) of Kingston-upon-Hull, York­
shire, England, at Bedford on September 21 , 1957. Using 5 guns and 7 loaders, 
he shot 1,000 in 42 minutes 22.5 seconds. "3 Is there an aesthetic aspect to clay 
pigeon shooting? 
Suppose we suppose ourselves present on that historic occasion to witness 
Joseph Nother's (formerly Wheater's) achievement. The occasion would not have 
been an occasion for any form of auditory satisfaction. On the contrary, we 
should have taken care to block our ears to prevent damage. Visually the scene 
must have been tedious: an hour of seeing clay bird after clay bird after clay 
bird being hurled into the air by a device, immediately to be blasted by the 
attentive Nother. Even sQ, it could have be1en (given the appropriate interests) 
an exciting event to witness, particularly if we kept count of the number of 
clay .birds blasted and if we had realized that a record-breaking was possibly in 
the offing. The tension would have or could have mounted, as clay birds and 
minutes moved. 
So there is an aesthetic aspect even to clay pigeon shooting. Is there? 
Doesn't even clay pigeon shooting have its dramatic moment1 Does it? And 
does that matter? The breaking of a record is perhaps a dramatic matter but 
that doesn't mean that clay pigeon shooting is a dramatic matter even if the 
record in question is a record of clay pigeon shooting. 
Perhaps another example will serve us better. Live birds may be livelier than 
clay pigeons. "The greatest re<'.orded lifetime bag is 556,000 birds, including 
241,000 pheasants, by the 2nd Marquess of Ripon (1867-1923) of England. 
He himself dropped dead on a grouse moor after his 52nd bird on the morning 
of September 22, 1923."4 Suppose we suppose that we are with the 2nd 
Marquess of Ripon on some occasion of this slaughter. An alarmed pheasant 
breaks cover only to be zapped by the ready Ripon. That could be an exciting 
moment. And still another example perhaps choicer. Biggest bag: "The largest 
animal ever shot by any big game hunter was a bull African elephant (Loxodon­
la africana ) shot by J. J. Fenykovi (Hungary), 48 miles north-northwest of 
Macusso, Angola, on November 13, 1955. It required 16 heavy caliber bullets 
from a 0.416 Rigby and weighed an estimated 24,000 lbs., standing 13 feet 2 
inches at the shoulder. "5 Wasn't that an exciting moment? 
Was that an aesthetic event? Those present must have been stirred aroused , , 
perhaps infuriated, perhaps nauseated by the mindless sportsman intent on his 
prey. That the event could excite does not establish the existence of an aesthetic 
aspect. Not everything exciting is aesthetic. The murder of such a massive 
creature would be likely to occasion some sort of strong reaction on the part of 
the spectators. Possibly nausea. I am not objecting to nausea as an aesthetic 
reaction. But their nausea, if that is what it was, would have been occasioned 
by what is not an aesthetic matter. 
What if per impossible in fact, the elephant was not shot, was unharmed, 
that all was a sham and a show: would the event so understood and witnessed 
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still be exciting; I think not. Would it evoke nausea? Not to the same extent if at 
all and if so for other reasons. For reality matters in sports in a way that it does 
not matter in art. To blast a clay pigeon out of the air may be minimally ex­
citing but only if in fact one actually blasts it, only if in fact there really is a 
clay pigeon and one really does aim, fire, and accomplish one's and its end. If 
such an affair were rigged, if say the whole event were subject to the control of 
a computer and one simply was to go through the motions, who would do it? 
Who would engage in such a practice? But that is not the way it is in matters 
pertaining to art. To be told that the man acting Lear on the stage is not in fact 
shedding genuine tears, not in fact the least bit unhappy, is in fact having the 
time of his life giving a gr,eat performance, all that is irrelevant. The excitement 
one feels in witnessing the play and the sympathy one feels for Lear remain 
the same. 
What I am saying here has been said before. "Now, where the question is 
whether something is beautiful, we do not want to know, whether we, or any 
one else, are, or even could be, concerned in the real existence of the thing, but 
rather what estimate we form of it on mere contemplation (intuition or 
reflection)."6 And there is no need to feel mystified by Kant's correct though 
unoriginal claim. For aesthetic reactions occur in the course of specific acts 
perform.ed in connection with entities of an appropriate sort. One such familiar 
act is that of contemplation: the performance of that act in connection with 
some event does not require that the event be real rather than simulated, acted, 
a matter of pretense. There is nothing new here. 
Clay pigeon shooting has no aesthetic aspect. The sport is of no aesthetic 
interest. This is not to deny that one can be interested in clay pigeon shooting. 
But not every interest is an aesthetic interest. (Perhaps the most interesting 
thing about clay pigeon shooting is that like all too many sports it is evidently a 
manifestation of aggression. When one looks at sports in general, aggressive not 
aesthetic as[pects are what loom large. Archery, boxing, bull fighting, fencing, 
football,  judo, karate, lacrosse, shooting, wrestling: all offer unmistakable ex­
amples of aggressive behavior. As anthropologists and sociologists are beginning 
to tell us, aggressive behavior is most likely learned, the result of cultural 
indoctrination. Our society would be better off without such sports. However, 
there doesn't seem to be any way of putting an end to them: not yet anyway.) 
The sport of clay pigeon shooting has no aesthetic aspect. The same is true of 
tiddlywinks, of shuffleboard, of archery, baseball, basketball, bicycling, bowling', 
canoeing, curling, golf, fishing. 
Doesn't fishing have an aesthetic aspect? Think of casting in a trout stream, 
crystal water, aromatic. pines surrounding mountains and so forth. All very 
nice, all irrelevant. Does brushing one's teeth have an aesthetic aspect? One 
could do it in a stream of crystal water in a piney forest and so forth. And one 
could also fish or brush one's teeth surroundred by garbage, smelling smog. 
Something is not an aspect of an activity unless it serves to individuate that 
activity. Being in deep waters is an aspect of deep-sea fishing: one wouldn't be 
deep-sea fishing if one weren't in deep waters. But standing in a stream of crystal 
water in a piney forest is not an aspect of fishing or even of trout fishing, for 
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one could be fishing or trout fishing even if  one were not there but were sur­
rounded. by garbage and knee-deep in sludge. 
_Unlike tiddlywinks,. shooting, shuffleboard, or archery, baseball, basketball, 
bicycling, bowling, canoeing, curling, fishing, golf, some sports have distinct 
aesthetic aspects. This is tr_ue of gymnastics, ski-jumping, figure skating, high­
diving, and even bull fighting. The relevant difference between the first a:nd 
second group is this: form is a grading factor only for the second. How one does 
it counts in the second group of sports but not in the first. Sink the ball, hit the 
target: that's what counts in the first group. Form doesn't. Hold the club any 
any way one likes, lo<>k like a duffer: if one manages somehow to .sink the ball 
expeditiously enough, one may end up a champion. 
But even though gymnastics has an aesthetic aspect, aesthetic factors have at 
best an inconsequential ancillary role to play in the sport. It is sometimes sup­
posed that there is a difficulty in drawing a sharp line between a performance of 
a ballet and a gymnastic event. There are similarities between the two. The 
differences remain obvious unmistakable. Various aesthetically relevant and 
significant aspects of ballet have no counterpart in gymnastics. A ballet is often 
a drama: the story is then an integral part of the event. Even when a ballet is 
without a story it cans for costumes, props, stage .scenery, decor that is in 
accord with the music: there is an intimate relation between auditory and 
supplementary visual features. None of this is true of gymnastics. Brute strength 
is an aspect of gymnastics but not of ballet. Suppose a ballet were designed to 
simulate a gymnastics performance. The dancer might be called on to do an L 
cross on the rings. Most likely he would have to fake it, which wouldn't be 
difficult: thin wires invisible to the audience would serve. Would the fact that he 
faked the cross make any difference to the aesthetic quality of the performance? 
Not if it didn't look like a fake (and perhaps not even if it did). And what if a 
real gymnast at an actual meet faked it? If it were discovered, he'd be dis­
qualified, excommunicated. The L cross on the rings:is an impressive gymnastic 
stunt. It is not aesthetically impressive. It calls for extraordinary strength or an 
extraordinary physique. It is no problem for any ordinary chimpanzee or any 
human who approximates a chimpanzee in appearance. A long-armed large­
chested legless freak could do an Olympic cross with ease. 
Gymnastics does have an aesthetic aspect. Though considerable strength is 
required for certain stunts, the L cross on the rings front and back levers, not 
strength but balance, smoothness, ease, timing are essential ingredients of various 
routines. A muscular but inept novice could manage a kip on the high bar by 
converting it essentially to a muscle·up. Rightly done, however, a kip on the 
bar doesn't require much strength. (Which is why the stunt is best practiced 
with an under-grip .which virtually precludes the possibility of converting it to a 
muscle-up.} A giant on the high bar calls for strength but timing and balance are 
also required. Properly executed the giant has an aesthetic appeal. And without a 
doubt a Hecht dismount is a spectacularly beautiful stunt. 
The aesthetic appeal of a gymnastic stunt such as the Hecht dismount from 
the high bar or for that matter of any properly executed gymnastic stunt, is a 
byproduct of other factors. Considerations of mechanical efficiency and strength 
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are fundamental in gymnastics. To execute a reverse giant correctly, it is 
necessary to keep one's arms straight throughout the swing. Why? Because a 
giant performed with anns bent is less beautiful? That's far from clear. If a 
gymnast were performing a routine with a sequence of giants, to execute one 
with bent arms might lend some variety to the event, an aesthetically desirable 
variety. But such a performance would be unacceptable to a gymnastics judge. 
A giant executed with bent arms is not mechanically perfect: it is inefficient and 
it calls for much greater strength to cope with the centrifugal force at the 
bottom of the swing. 
Although form does not figure in its scoring, tennis has at least on occasion 
considerable aesthetic appeal. A flat forehand drive executed with perfect form 
from the baseline is a graceful stroke. Even so aesthetic factors have no role to 
play in tennis: its aesthetic appeal is simply an epiphenomenon. Anyone who 
plays the game seriously knows this but it is easy to misunderstand the matter. 
Any tournament player is familiar with players who rally beautifully, hitting 
the ball with grace and ease, but who play badly. And any tournament player is 
familiar with players who have awkward looking strokes and graceless move­
ments but who by dint of agility and effort manage over and over again to 
return seeming put-aways, and hence are extremely difficult to beat. It is not 
looks but points that win a tennis match. 
Nonetheless, generally speaking it is a fact that improving one's appearance, 
making one's movements smoother, more graceful, is likely to upgrade one's 
performance. Making sure that the forehand is hit with a long fluid follow­
through will not only add grace to one's stroke but it will increase one's control 
while adding considerable pace to the ball. (It also means that one has less time 
to prepare for the next stroke. It. would be no consolation to know that one 
would look graceful while the ball was being returned for a winner by an 
opponent who cared less about looks than about points.) Not. all good tennis 
strokes, however, are particularly graceful. Laver's midcourt topspin forehand 
is a wristy, flicking sort of stroke having none of the aesthetic appeal of his 
great backhand baseline topspin drive. Yet Laver uses that wristy, flicking, top­
spin forehand with. great success. The beauty of tennis is simply owing to the 
by-now-familiar fact that beauty is often a byproduct of mechanical efficiency. 
(Possibly at times mechanical efficiency is itself taken as a standard of beauty.) 
That beauty is a sometime byproduct of mechanical efficiency has been known 
at least since the time that people began treating airplane propellers as objects of 
art. 
'l'he aesthetics of sport is a subject without any significant problems. 
Aesthetic questions posed by a study of gymnastics or tennis have already been 
posed and are better posed either in connection with traditional art forms such 
as the classical ballet or in connection with various forms of modern art such as 
l'art trouv6. There are significant philosophical problems to be considered i n  
connection with sports but they are not problems of aesthetics: they are epis­
temological, linguistic and logical in character. 
Consider a flat forehand drive hit from the baseline in tennis. To hit such a 
drive properly there are various things one should do. Move forward to the ball. 
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Bend one's knees. Hit the ball as far in front of the body as is feasible. Hit it on 
the rise before it reaches the top of the bounce but not so early as to convert 
the stroke into a half-volley. And so on. To supply such specifications, one 
describes as accurately and as carefully as one can what a fine player actually 
does in executing the stroke in question. The task of supplying such specifi­
cations is primarily descriptive and analytic. (That there is likely in fact to be 
some sort of i!'.fealizatii.on involved is no doubt true but not germane to my 
purposes here and now.) A trained observer, a tennis coach, attempts to perform 
this sort of descriptive analytic task. 
Suppose a player is told by the coach that he does not bend his knees enough 
in hitting the forehand. Presumably the player wishing to improve his stroke will 
attend to what he was told. How does he do that'? Since he was told to bend his 
knees when he hits the ball he does just that. That means he will move his legs 
in such a way as to make them conform to the description supplied by the coach. 
How does he know whether or not he has done that'? The coach knows by 
looking at the player. But how does the player himself know'? 
In recent years some philosophers have toyed with what they call "knowledge 
without observation," it supposedly being the kind of knowledge one has on 
one's bodily position, of the position of one's limbs and so forth. qne reason 
why sports provide a fertile epistemological field is that one finds that often 
athletes (or would-be athletes) do not in farct know the position of their own 
limbs. Many players think they bend a great deal in stroking a ball whereas in 
fact they hardly bend at all. This is a particularly common illusion with ·respect 
to the service motion in tennis. 
Suppose a conscientious player uses a mirror to check whether he is bending 
enough. Then having rehearsed the stroke before the mirror he attempts to 
execute it on a court. Evidently he must somehow remember what it felt like 
when he bent in the appropriate way before the mirror. How does he do that'? 
I am not asking how he manages to remember advice. I take it for granted for 
the time being that people can remember words and symbolic matters. I do not 
know how they do that but that is not in question here. What I am asking is 
how one manages to remember positions of the body. And the form of the 
answer must be, or so it seems at present, that something in one's mind con­
stitutes a representation of the body position in question. Is that right? I 
really don't know, but it certainly seems so to me. And if that is right, then 
that suggests that his mental representation of his bodily position plays a role 
similar to that played by the explicit linguistic description to the effect that his 
knees are bent in the desired way. Are there significant similarities here? 
Assuming that the player does have a mental representation of his bodily 
position, what is the correct, or a correct, or at least a reasonable characteriza­
tion of that representation? The term one encounters in psychological 
discussions of related matters is "image". But that that is a plausible 
characterization is not clear to me. If that is an image, then that sort of image 
seems radically different from what are spoken of as visual images. Is it an 
image'? 
Coaches generally do not restrict themselves to descriptive analytic comments. 
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If a player is having problems keeping the ball on the racquet, the coach may 
suggest that he think of it in a certain way: 'Imagine that you are to hit not 
just one ball but seven of them all in a row'. Such advice is apt to be helpful. 
How it manages to be that is remarkably difficult to say. Possibly the player 
forms the appropriate image in his mind. He then somehow adjusts his move­
ments in accordance with this image. How is that done? 
I do not have adequate answers to the questions I have been raising. If I did I 
should not have raised them here. And there are other related questions lhat 
want asking and answering. What is actually accomplished by practicing a 
stroke? Are effective short-cuts possible? If not, why not? Many tasks can be 
learned in a very short time: why can't one learn a fine forehand in a short 
time? Does runderstanding how an act is performed facilitate the performance 
of the act? If it does, why does it, and if it doesn't, why doesn't it? These are 
just a few of the difficult problems that stare back at a thinking being when he 
turns his eyes on sports. Such problems as these and not aesthetic trivialities 
are deserving of a philosopher's careful attention. 
FOOTNOTES 
1constance Reid, Hilbert (New York 1970) pp. 74-75. 
2Hilbert was born on January 23, 1862. 
3Norris and Ross McWhinter, Guinneu Sports Re�ord Dook, 2nd Edition. (New York. 
1972) p. 11 2. Ibid_ 
Srbid. 
61mmanuel Kant, CriHque of Aesthetic Judgement, Bk. I, 2. 
4 7  
8
Philosophic Exchange, Vol. 5 [1974], No. 1, Art. 11
http://digitalcommons.brockport.edu/phil_ex/vol5/iss1/11
